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Module 1: Introduction to Network SecurityLesson 1.1 (1 of 3 in this module)1 of 10 in the Fortinet Fundamentals course

Network security and common threats

What network security protects, the threats it faces, and the layered defences that answer them.

Beginner · 14 min read

Examples use FortiOS 7.6 · FortiOS 7.4: differences noted in the lesson

Exam domain: NSE 4 (FortiOS 7.6) · Content inspectionFundamentals

Before this: Network security basics, Firewall basics

What you will learn

After this lesson, you can name the main threats a network faces, explain each with the CIA triad and the idea of risk, and choose the defensive layer and FortiGate feature that answers each threat.

  • Confidentiality, integrity, availability
  • Common threats
  • Defence in depth

Network security is the set of controls that keep a network and the data crossing it confidential, unaltered and available. It combines technical controls (firewalls, intrusion prevention, encryption, authentication, logging) with processes such as patching and incident response, arranged in layers so that one failure doesn't expose everything.

In simple terms: Keep the wrong people out, keep the data correct, keep the services running, and notice quickly when any of that fails.

A real-life situation

Kestrel Valley Clinics, a fictional company, runs six small clinics and one head office. Its network has a FortiGate at the edge, a single flat office LAN, a file server, and a remote access VPN that accepts a username and password. One Monday the file server's shares are encrypted and a ransom note is on every desktop. The investigation finds that nothing exotic happened: a phishing email, a stolen password, a VPN without MFA, an unpatched server and a network where every device could reach every other device. Each step could have been stopped by a control the company either lacked or had switched off. This lesson explains the threats in that chain, the layers that answer them, and where a FortiGate fits.

What network security protects: the CIA triad

Security decisions become clearer when you ask which of three properties is at stake. Most incidents damage more than one.

PropertyMeaningExample of a breachTypical controls
ConfidentialityOnly authorised people can read the dataPatient records copied to an attacker's serverEncryption, access control, MFA, segmentation
IntegrityData and systems are not changed without authorisationMalware alters payment details in invoicesHashes and signatures, change control, IPS, file integrity monitoring
AvailabilitySystems and data are usable when neededRansomware encrypts the file server; a DDoS fills the Internet linkBackups, redundancy, DoS protection, high availability

Ransomware is a good example of all three: it denies availability by encrypting files, and modern groups also copy the data first (a confidentiality breach) to threaten publication if the ransom isn't paid.

Assets, threats, vulnerabilities and risk

Four words carry most security conversations. Use them precisely:

  • Asset: anything worth protecting. Data (patient records), systems (the file server), services (the VPN) and the network itself.
  • Vulnerability: a weakness. An unpatched service, a default password, a firewall policy that allows all services, a user who trusts every email.
  • Threat: something that could exploit a vulnerability. A criminal group, a worm, a careless insider, a power cut.
  • Risk: likelihood multiplied by impact. You can't remove every threat, so you reduce likelihood (patch, filter, authenticate) or impact (segment, back up, encrypt), and accept what remains on purpose.

A firewall reduces risk mainly by shrinking the attack surface, the set of services an attacker can reach, and by inspecting what it still allows. Every policy you add increases the surface a little, which is why each one needs a reason.

Common threats

The threats below cause most real incidents. None is new, and most incidents chain several of them together.

ThreatWhat it isWhat it usually damages
MalwareMalicious software: viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, loaders that fetch more malwareAll three
RansomwareMalware that encrypts data and demands payment, often after copying it outAvailability, confidentiality
PhishingFake emails, messages or web pages that trick a user into giving credentials or running a fileConfidentiality (first step of many attacks)
Credential attacksPassword guessing, password spraying (one common password against many accounts), stuffing leaked passwordsConfidentiality
Exploiting unpatched servicesUsing a known flaw in a VPN gateway, web server, mail server or file-sharing protocolAll three
DoS / DDoSFlooding a service or link so legitimate users can't use it; distributed when many sources attack at onceAvailability
Insider threatsStaff or contractors misusing legitimate access, on purpose or by mistakeConfidentiality, integrity
Lateral movementSpreading from the first compromised device to servers and other hostsTurns a small incident into a large one
Data exfiltrationCopying data out, often to cloud storage or over an encrypted channelConfidentiality
DNS-based threatsLookups of malicious or newly registered domains, DNS tunnelling to hide data in queries, DNS hijackingConfidentiality, integrity
Command and control (C2)Malware calling home for instructions, usually over HTTPS or DNS so it blends inEnables every later stage

Notice how many of these use ordinary protocols: phishing pages are HTTPS, C2 often looks like web or DNS traffic, exfiltration may be an upload to a real cloud service. A port-based firewall rule such as "allow TCP 443 to the Internet" can't tell them apart from normal work. That is the main reason firewalls grew into next-generation firewalls that inspect content, identify applications and check reputation.

How an attack unfolds

Security teams describe attacks as a chain of stages. Formal models such as the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain and MITRE ATT&CK name them in more detail; in plain terms most attacks look like this:

1. Reconnaissance
Find targets: scan for exposed services, collect staff email addresses.
2. Initial access
Phishing, stolen credentials or an exploited Internet-facing service.
3. Execution and persistence
Run malware and make sure it survives a reboot.
4. Command and control
The malware calls home for instructions, usually over HTTPS or DNS.
5. Discovery and lateral movement
Scan the inside network, steal more credentials, reach servers.
6. Exfiltration
Copy valuable data out of the network.
7. Impact
Encrypt, delete or alter data, or disrupt services.
A simplified attack chain. Defenders win by breaking any link: the earlier, the cheaper.

The useful insight is that the attacker must succeed at every stage, while the defender only needs to break one. A control that blocks C2 traffic, for example, can make an infected laptop harmless even after the antivirus missed the file.

Defence in depth

Defence in depth means several independent layers, chosen so that each catches what the one before it misses. No single product provides all of them.

LayerWhat it doesExamples
PerimeterControls traffic between the network and the InternetFirewall policies, IPS, web and DNS filtering, DoS protection
SegmentationDivides the inside into zones with policies between themVLANs per role, a DMZ, server and user zones, internal firewall policies
EndpointProtects each devicePatching, endpoint protection (EPP/EDR), host firewall, disk encryption
IdentityProves who is connecting and limits what they can doMFA, least privilege, separate admin accounts, identity-based policies
DataProtects the data itselfEncryption, offline or immutable backups, access controls
Logging and responseDetects what got through and supports the investigationCentral logs, alerts, a SIEM, an incident response plan

Learn more: Network SegmentationFirewall Placement, Segmentation and Zero Trust

Mapping threats to FortiGate features

A FortiGate contributes to several layers: perimeter, segmentation (internal policies between zones), part of identity (user-based policies, MFA for VPN) and logging. The table maps each threat to a control and to the FortiGate feature that implements it. The last column is honest about the limits.

ThreatControlFortiGate featureLimit
Malware downloadsScan files in transitAntivirus profile (FortiGuard signatures, optional sandboxing)Needs deep SSL inspection for HTTPS; new malware may have no signature yet
Exploits against servers and clientsDetect and block attack patternsIPS sensorVirtual patching buys time; it doesn't replace the patch
Phishing and malicious sitesBlock by category and reputationWeb filter (FortiGuard categories), DNS filterBrand-new phishing domains may be unrated for a short time
C2 and DNS-based threatsBlock lookups of known malicious domains; detect C2 trafficDNS filter (botnet C&C domains), IPS botnet detectionMalware using encrypted DNS directly may bypass the DNS filter
Risky or unsanctioned applicationsIdentify apps regardless of portApplication controlSome apps are identified fully only with deep inspection
Lateral movementOnly allow what each zone needsInternal segmentation policies between VLANs or zones, with IPSOnly traffic that crosses the FortiGate is controlled
Credential attacks on VPNStrong authenticationMFA on VPN (for example FortiToken or a SAML identity provider), lockout settingsMFA fatigue and token theft are still possible
DoS / DDoSThresholds for floods and anomaliesDoS policy on the WAN interfaceA volumetric DDoS larger than the link must be stopped upstream
Exploitation of the firewall itselfReduce exposed services; patchRestricted administrative access, trusted hosts, local-in policies, firmware updatesOnly as good as the patching discipline
Data exfiltrationLimit and watch outbound trafficOutbound policies by destination and service, application control, DLP profileEncrypted uploads to allowed cloud services are hard to judge
Anything that gets throughDetect and investigateTraffic and security logs sent to FortiAnalyzer or a SIEMLogs only help if someone or something reviews them

Two features carry most of that table for encrypted traffic: SSL inspection decides how much of HTTPS the other profiles can see, and logging decides whether anyone notices.

Learn more: Security Profiles and Inspection ModesSSL/TLS Inspection

Walk-through: one incident, layer by layer

Here is the Kestrel Valley incident, mapped to the course lab. The VPN terminates on FGT1's port1 (203.0.113.2), PC1 (10.0.1.10) is a receptionist's PC, and in this version of the story the file server sits in the same flat LAN.

port1203.0.113.0/30port210.0.1.0/24port310.0.2.0/24InternetISP gateway 203.0.113.1FGT1FortiGateSW1LAN switchSW2DMZ switchPC1LAN · 10.0.1.10WEB1DMZ · 10.0.2.10
  1. 1. Phishing: A fake login page captures a user's VPN password.
  2. 2. Initial access: The attacker logs in to the VPN with only a password.
  3. 3. Lateral movement: From the VPN, the attacker scans and reaches every LAN host.
  4. 4. C2 and exfiltration: Malware calls home over HTTPS and uploads stolen files.
StageWhat happenedLayer that could have stopped it
1. PhishingAn email linked to a fake VPN login page on a domain registered two days earlierWeb or DNS filter blocking newly registered and phishing domains; user awareness training
2. Initial accessThe attacker logged in to the VPN with the stolen password from an unusual countryMFA on the VPN user group; geography-based address objects to restrict VPN sources
3. DiscoveryThe VPN policy allowed all to the whole LAN, so a port scan found the file serverA VPN policy allowing only the services VPN users need; IPS detecting scans
4. ExploitationA file-sharing flaw, patched by the vendor months earlier, gave the attacker control of the serverPatching; IPS signatures for the known exploit (virtual patching)
5. Lateral movementFrom the server, stolen admin credentials reached every PCSegmentation: servers and users in separate zones with policies between them
6. C2 and exfiltrationMalware beaconed to a known C2 domain and uploaded 40 GB to a file-sharing service overnightDNS filter blocking C2 domains; application control limiting file-sharing apps; alerts on unusual outbound volume
7. ImpactFiles encrypted on Monday morningOffline or immutable backups, so recovery doesn't depend on paying

Logs existed on the FortiGate but were kept only on its local disk, were overwritten within days, and nobody was alerted. With logs sent to FortiAnalyzer and an alert for VPN logins from new countries, stage 2 would have been noticed on the Friday. The lesson for design: no stage needed an advanced attacker, and every stage had a cheap control.

What this looks like on a FortiGate

On a FortiGate, most perimeter controls attach to a firewall policy. A policy that allows traffic without profiles only checks addresses, ports and users. The same policy with profiles also inspects what passes. In the GUI you set them in the policy dialog under Security Profiles; in the CLI they are fields of the policy:

config firewall policy edit 3 set name "LAN-to-Internet" set utm-status enable set ssl-ssh-profile "certificate-inspection" set av-profile "default" set webfilter-profile "default" set dnsfilter-profile "default" set ips-sensor "default" set application-list "default" set logtraffic all next end

Attaches the built-in default profiles to the LAN-to-Internet policy and logs all its sessions. Tune real profiles before relying on them.

  • utm-status enable turns security profiles on for the policy.
  • ssl-ssh-profile sets how much of encrypted traffic is visible. certificate-inspection reads only the server name and certificate, which is enough for web and DNS category decisions but not for scanning file contents.
  • av-profile, ips-sensor, webfilter-profile, dnsfilter-profile and application-list attach the antivirus, IPS, web filter, DNS filter and application control profiles.
  • logtraffic all logs every session the policy allows, not only security events. It costs log storage, so decide per policy.

⚠ Adding profiles changes what users experience

Enabling profiles on a busy policy can block things users rely on and adds inspection load. Start with monitor actions where a profile supports them, review the logs for a week, and change production policies in a maintenance window with a configuration backup taken first.

Verification

Signatures and ratings are only useful if they are current. Check the FortiGuard databases and when they last updated:

diagnose autoupdate versions

Lists each FortiGuard database (antivirus, IPS, application control and others) with its version, last update and contract expiry.

Example output · based on Fortinet documentation; exact format varies by model and FortiOS version
FGT1 # diagnose autoupdate versions
AV Engine
---------
Version: 7.00xxx
Contract Expiry Date: Mon Mar 15 2027
Last Updated using scheduled update on ...
Last Update Attempt: Mon Oct 12 05:41:00 2026
Result: No Updates
...
IPS Attack Engine
---------
...
Application Definitions
---------
...
Illustrative output, trimmed. Look for a contract expiry date in the future and a recent last update attempt. An expired contract or months-old definitions mean the profiles are checking against stale data.

Then confirm that logs leave the box. show log fortianalyzer setting shows whether FortiAnalyzer logging is enabled and to which server; in the GUI, Log & Report shows recent security events, and an empty IPS or antivirus log on a busy policy is a reason to check that the profiles are really attached.

FortiOS 7.6 and 7.4

The concepts in this lesson apply to both releases. One remote access change matters: FortiOS 7.6.3 removed SSL VPN tunnel mode on every model, and Fortinet's replacement is IPsec VPN with FortiClient; FortiOS 7.4 still offers tunnel mode. Plan the move before upgrading, and apply MFA whichever VPN type you use.

What can go wrong

IPS and antivirus are enabled, yet the logs show nothing

Weeks of traffic, and not one security event. It looks like a quiet network; usually it is a blind one.

Show the fix

Check three things in order: the profiles are attached to the policies that carry the traffic (not only to an unused test policy), the FortiGuard databases are current (diagnose autoupdate versions), and HTTPS is visible enough for the profile. Antivirus can't scan a file inside TLS with certificate inspection only; that needs deep inspection, with the CA trusted by clients.

Malware still calls home although the DNS filter is on

The DNS filter logs show nothing for the infected host, but IPS or the endpoint reports C2 traffic.

Show the fix

The host is probably resolving names through a resolver the FortiGate doesn't see, such as DNS over HTTPS to a public provider. Allow DNS only to your internal resolvers, block outbound DNS (UDP and TCP 53) to other servers, and use application control to block DNS-over-HTTPS applications where policy allows. Then confirm the DNS filter is applied to the policy that carries the resolvers' outbound queries.

An internal infection spreads although the perimeter is tight

Every PC and server sits in one VLAN, so traffic between them doesn't pass through the FortiGate.

Show the fix

Segment: put users, servers and management in separate VLANs or interfaces on the FortiGate, then write policies that allow only the services each zone needs, with IPS on the policies towards servers. Traffic that stays inside one VLAN is switched, not routed, and no firewall policy applies to it.

Enterprise use and design guidance

  • Start from the assets. List what matters most (patient data, payment systems, backups) and design layers around it, rather than starting from a product list.
  • Treat remote access as Internet-facing. VPN gateways and their login pages are a common first target. Require MFA, limit sources where you can, and patch the firewall promptly.
  • Segment by role and risk. Users, servers, guests, IoT and management each get their own zone. Internal policies are where lateral movement is stopped.
  • Plan for encrypted traffic. Decide where deep inspection is used and where privacy or pinned applications require exemptions.
  • Centralise logs. Send logs off the device to FortiAnalyzer or a SIEM, keep them long enough for an investigation (often months), and alert on high-value events.

Best practices

  • Allow only the services each policy needs; avoid all as a service on anything but tightly scoped policies.
  • Require MFA for remote access and for administrator logins.
  • Keep FortiGuard subscriptions active and check that databases update.
  • Patch Internet-facing systems first, including the FortiGate itself, and follow Fortinet's PSIRT advisories.
  • Keep backups offline or immutable, and test restores.
  • Review logs regularly, and alert on VPN logins, admin logins and blocked C2 attempts.

🛠 Practical exercise: map your own network

On paper, list five assets in a network you know (home lab, workplace or the course lab). For each, write one realistic threat, the vulnerability it would use, and the CIA property it would damage. Then pick the layer and the FortiGate feature from this lesson that would reduce the risk, and note one thing the FortiGate could not do about it. If you have a FortiGate VM, run diagnose autoupdate versions and record which databases are current and which need a licence.

Key takeaways

✅ Key takeaways
  • Security protects confidentiality, integrity and availability; risk combines likelihood and impact.
  • Real attacks chain simple steps: phishing, stolen credentials, unpatched services, lateral movement, C2.
  • Defence in depth layers perimeter, segmentation, endpoint, identity, data and logging controls.
  • A FortiGate maps threats to features: IPS, antivirus, web and DNS filtering, application control, segmentation policies, DoS policies, VPN MFA and logging.
  • Each feature has limits, most of all with encrypted traffic and traffic that doesn't cross the firewall.

Check yourself

Predict · scenario 1

Ransomware encrypts a file server after copying its data to the attacker. Which CIA properties are affected?

Predict · scenario 2

An attacker on a compromised laptop scans and reaches servers in the same VLAN. Which FortiGate control helps most?

Predict · scenario 3

Stolen VPN passwords keep being used to log in. Which control breaks this stage of the attack?

Predict · scenario 4

IPS and antivirus are attached to a policy, but diagnose autoupdate versions shows the contract expired a year ago. What follows?

Predict · scenario 5

A 200 Gbps DDoS hits a site with a 1 Gbps Internet link. Can the FortiGate's DoS policy stop the outage?

Next: how firewalls themselves evolved in Stateless, stateful and next-generation firewalls, then where to place them in Firewall placement, segmentation and zero trust.

Official documentation

Links open the named page in Fortinet's documentation (checked 12 October 2026). RouteLearn is an independent educational resource, not affiliated with or endorsed by Fortinet. Fortinet, FortiGate, FortiOS, FortiManager and FortiGuard are trademarks of Fortinet, Inc. Example output on this page is illustrative.

FAQ

Is a firewall enough to secure a network?
No. A firewall controls which connections are allowed and, as an NGFW, inspects them, but it can't patch a server, stop a user typing a password into a fake site on a personal phone, or see traffic that doesn't pass through it. It is one important layer among several: identity, endpoint protection, segmentation, backups and monitoring.
What is the difference between a threat, a vulnerability and a risk?
A vulnerability is a weakness, such as an unpatched VPN appliance. A threat is something that could use it, such as a ransomware group scanning the Internet. Risk combines the two with the impact: an unpatched, Internet-facing service holding customer data is a high risk; the same flaw on an isolated lab machine is a low one.
Why do attackers bother with lateral movement?
The first device they reach, often a user's laptop, is rarely what they want. The valuable targets are file servers, databases, backups and domain controllers. A flat network lets them reach all of those from the first foothold; segmentation forces every step through a policy that can block and log it.